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I. INTRODUCTION 
Not long ago, I bought a lamp on-line as a Christmas gift for my 
parents. After ordering, I was able to immediately pay using an on-line 
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service. The next day I received an e-mail confirming receipt of payment, 
stating that the item would be shipped in seven to ten business days; at the 
bottom of the receipt were the seller's boilerplate warranties and other 
provisions. The lawyer in me could not help but read through these clauses, 
and amongst them was a clause limiting liability to the cost of the goods. I 
began to imagine what possible consequential damages I could incur from 
the transaction. If the lamp arrived 6 weeks late, could I recover punitively 
for the loss of love and affection of my parents because they received a late 
Christmas present? Probably not, but I did question whether this single 
unilateral addition to the agreement would be binding on me if I were a 
merchant. 
The ordering of goods followed by the issuance of receipts or invoices is 
a common practice in a number of industries. Electronic commerce and the 
advent and increasing use of e-mail confirmations and correspondence have 
only added to this practice. Often times, however, one or both parties to 
such a transaction include additional terms to the contract in their orders, 
conformations or invoices. The "battle of the forms," 1 as this is known, 
continues to generate problems with regard to whether additional clauses 
should be enforced. Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C.")-the section that deals with conflicting terms in the buyers' and 
sellers' forms-instructs that additional terms that "materially alter" the 
contract do not become a part of the contract.2 But what types of terms are 
deemed to "materially alter" the contract? Though the commentary to 
section 2-207 explicitly deals with a number of these situations,3 one 
problem not resolved by the commentary-and one that has caused varying 
results in the case law-is the effect of a clause limiting liability. How 
courts should approach this situation is perplexing due, at least in part, to the 
great variance in the sophistication of the parties and the events leading up to 
the disputes. 
Take, for example, the following two hypothetical situations. In 
situation one, a local, non-profit youth soccer league orders 1,500 specially 
made shirts to sell at its annual fall weekend soccer tournament. The shirts 
are embroidered with the tournament's name and have always been a huge 
seller for the soccer league, bringing in much-needed revenue to run the 
league. The league receives a cost estimate from a large t-shirt supply 
company that can do the embroidery and sends in its order with payment, 
specifying that the shirts must be delivered no later than the Thursday before 
the tournament starts. The t-shirt supplier sends a confirmation of the order 
I. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "battle of the fonns" as "(t]he 
conflict between the tenns of standard fonns exchanged between a buyer and a seller during contract 
negotiations"). 
2. u.c.c. § 2-207(2)(6) (2004). 
3. See'U.C.C. § 2-207 cmts. 1-7. 
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and at the bottom of the confirmation is a clause excluding consequential 
damages. The tournament starts but the league does not receive the shirts 
until the Monday after the tournament. The supplier agrees to return the 
check, but refuses to compensate the league for the lost profits in reliance on 
its exclusion of consequential damages clause. 
In situation two, Company A, a manufacturer of polystyrene, posts an 
offer to sell 5,000 metric tons for $.20 per pound on an on-line trading 
platform. Company B accepts Company A's offer and delivers a purchase 
contract to Company A the same day. The contract lists the quantity, price, 
and time of delivery. The next day, Company A responds with its 
acceptance via a Polystyrene Sales Order Confirmation. Attached to this 
Confirmation is Company A's list of General Terms and Conditions. This 
attachment contains provisions limiting liability and excusing 
nonperformance. The limitation of liability provision states, in relevant part, 
that "NEITHER PARTY WILL BE LIABLE FOR ANY PROSPECTIVE 
PROFITS, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES." Company A is unable to supply the contracted-for quantity 
by the date specified and Company B sues for breach of contract, seeking 
consequential damages. Company A defends that it has a valid limitation of 
liability clause excluding consequential damages. 
Should the law treat these situations similarly when applying the 
"material alteration" standard? There are several distinctions between the 
two, not just in the amount of money involved, but also in the sophistication 
of the parties and the goods involved. Should it matter that the soccer league 
had no legal advice while the t-shirt supply company had in-house counsel? 
Should it matter that Company B could have easily obtained the polystyrene 
from an alternate source or that the polystyrene was only needed to fulfill a 
contract with a sister company? Interestingly, while some courts might 
consider these factors, others do not, leading to varying results under the 
very same set of facts. 
It is important to note that an analysis of the approaches used by the 
courts is no mere academic exercise. The varying approaches used by courts 
have led to uncertainty for clients and lawyers alike.4 In courts that have not 
spoken on this issue, there is no way of knowing what approach a court will 
choose. Also, because courts in different jurisdictions have taken different 
approaches to this issue, this has encouraged forum shopping. Finally, the 
lack of uniformity among the courts runs counter to the very purposes and 
4. See infra Part III. 
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policies of the U.C.C., "to make uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions."5 
This article will describe the varying approaches tl!at courts use to 
decide whether clauses limiting liability materially alter the contract under 
U.C.C. section 2-207. In Part II, the article reviews the development of 
U.C.C. section 2-207, beginning with its common law roots, and its 
interaction with the section limiting liability.6 In Part III, the three principal 
approaches used by the courts, the per se material alteration approach, the 
per se not material alteration approach and the "surprise or hardship" 
approach are discussed and analyzed.7 Ultimately, this article concludes that 
the "surprise or hardship" model is the approach most consistent with the 
dictates of the revised section 2-207.8 Finally, Part IV reflects upon what 
effect the revisions to Article 2 will have on these approaches.9 
II. THE HISTORY AND OPERATION OF SECTION 2-207 
Our soccer league and polystyrene examples present classic "battle of 
the forms" scenarios. In such cases, when one merchant sends an offer, 
either verbally or in writing, to another merchant, 10 and that merchant 
responds with his own set of preprinted forms which contain additional or 
different terms from the initial offer, then the provisions ofU.C.C. section 2-
207 are applicable. 11 Section 2-207 states: 
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation. 
5. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c) (2004). 
6. See infra Part II. 
7. See infra Part 1~1. 
8. See infra Part III.C.4. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
I 0. The sub-sections of section 2-207(2) relevant to the "material alteration" language are only 
applicable "between merchants." U.C.C. 2-207(2) (stating that "[b]etween merchants such terms 
become part of the contract unless ... "). The U.C.C. defines "merchant" as, 
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out 
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction 
or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or 
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such 
knowledge or skill. 
u.c.c. § 2-104. 
II. See Dale Homing Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus., 710 F. Supp. 693, 697 (S.D. Ind. 1989) 
(noting that where there was a conflict between an oral agreement and the terms of a form, the case 
called for "what is in theory a straightforward application of§ 2-207"); In re Chateaugay Corp. v. N. 
States Contracting Co., Inc., 162 B.R. 949,954 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying section 2-207 to a 
case where "two merchants exchanged two sets of forms that contained additional or different terms, 
ignored them, and fully or substantially performed their agreement"). 
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( 1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different 
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or different term 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part 
of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a 
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the 
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such 
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on 
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this 
Act.I2 
12. U.C.C. § 2-207. U.C.C. section 2-207 comment I states: 
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written 
confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal 
correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending 
formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not 
discussed. The other situation is offer and acceptance, in which a wire or letter expressed 
and intended as an acceptance or the closing of an agreement adds further minor 
suggestions or proposals such as "ship by Tuesday," "rush," "ship draft against bill of 
lading inspection allowed," or the like. A frequent example of the second situation is the 
exchange of printed purchase order and acceptance (sometimes called 
"acknowledgment") forms. Because the forms are oriented to the thinking of the 
respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond. Often 
the seller's form contains terms different from or additional to those set forth in the 
buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction. [Comment I was 
amended in 1966.] 
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. I. 
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As will be discussed, section 2-207 was formulated to remedy problems 
that arose at common law. Despite the drafters' best efforts, however, this 
provision has proven to be wrought with problems. 13 
A. The "Battle of the Forms" at Common Law 
At common law, parties to a contract were subject to the "mirror-image 
rule." Under this rule, a party's acceptance of an offer had to precisely 
match the terms of the offer to be effective. 14 If a party sent back a 
confirmation with additional or different terms, this was deemed a 
counteroffer and thus a rejection of the original offer. 15 This did not prevent 
parties, however, from moving forward with the contract, potentially leading 
to later disputes over the terms ·of the agreement. Under the common law 
approach to the battle of the forms, the party that fired the "last shot" was 
favored because that party's terms were viewed as assented to. 16 The 
performance of the parties would make clear a contract was formed, and, as 
the last form sent was deemed as a counteroffer (rejecting any prior offer), 
the contract was on the terms of the party that sent the last counteroffer. 17 
As the seller was often the party that fired the last shot with a "confirmation 
of sale," the common law favored the seller. 18 
This common law system ignored, however, the fact that many times the 
parties to such contracts utilize their own forms with little consideration of 
the terms that are actually sent or received. Often the contracting process 
begins with subordinates placing a phone call or with the dispatching of an 
order form. 19 Both parties have their own forms, which often agree on many 
of the major terms such as price, quality, quantity and delivery terms, but 
differ on other important terms.20 Professor Macauley aptly summarized this 
battle of the forms process as follows, 
[T]he seller may fail to read the buyer's 24 paragraphs of fine print 
and may accept the buyer's order on the seller's own 
acknowledgment-of-order-form. Typically this form will have ten 
13. Indeed, the section has even been compared to "an amphibious tank that was originally 
designed to fight in the swamps, but was sent to fight in the desert." I JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 1-3, at 6 (4th ed. 1995). 
14. See Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for 
Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REv. 893, 901 (1991); I E. 
ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.21, at 315-16 (3d ed. 2004). 
15. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra 14, at 315. 
16. !d. at 318. 
17. See id. 
18. !d. 
19. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra 13, § 1-3, at 7. 
20. See id. 
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to 50 paragraphs favoring the seller, and these provisions are likely 
to be different from or inconsistent with the buyer's provisions. 
The seller's acknowledgement form may be received by the buyer 
and checked by a clerk. She will read the face of the 
acknowledgment but not the fine print on the back of it because she 
has neither the time nor ability to analyze the small print.21 
Many times this difference in terms is of no consequence and the deal will 
go forward without any problems.22 But when there is a dispute, the parties 
then must pull out their forms, sometimes for the first time, to see what they 
actually contracted for. 23 
The common law, though straightforward in application, often resulted 
in seriously unpleasant economic surprises when the parties learned that the 
law did not reflect their own understanding of the contract.24 This result led 
savvy (or perhaps sneaky) sellers to take advantage of the "last-shot 
doctrine" by including their own terms-terms that effectively became a 
secret provision because the forms' use, namely economic efficiency, meant 
that the forms were rarely read.25 Though the seller was often the last party 
to file a form, or the "last shot," the common law's effect was to encourage 
"a constant effort by businessmen to gain an advantage in their transactions 
by qualifying their obligations by means of forms containing unilaterally 
beneficial conditions."26 The common law rule also provided a loophole for 
parties wishing to extricate themselves from unfavorable deals which, in 
commercial understanding, had been closed.27 Thus, parties could attempt to 
21. Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
Soc. REv. 55, 59 (1963). 
22. See I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra I 3, § 1-3, at 7. 
23. See id.; Brown, supra note 14, at 901-02; Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the 
Forms: Problems With Solutions, 80 KY. L.J. 815, 818 (1992) (noting that the mirror image rule is 
based on an assumption contrary to modern realities). 
24. See Brown, supra 14, at 902. 
25. !d. at 902-03. 
26. Recent Case, Offeree's Response Materially Altering an Offer Solely to Offeror's 
Disadvantage is an Acceptance Conditional on Offeror's Assent to the Additional Terms Under 
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 132, 133 (1962); Stephens, 
supra note 23, at 819-20 (noting that the contract was controlled by whichever party fired the "last 
shot"). 
27. See Recent Case, supra note 26, at 133; Stephens, supra note 23, at 819 ("Once the variation 
was discovered, the recalcitrant party could refuse to consummate the transaction, with immunity, by 
alleging that a legally enforceable and binding contract was never formed."). 
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renege on a deal which had been made merely because of inconsequential 
variations between the offer and acceptance. 28 
The oft-criticized case of Poe/ v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,29 is a 
classic example of how the common law often operated counter to the true 
intentions of the contracting parties.30 In Poe/, the plaintiffs, Poel & Arnold, 
had entered into negotiations with the defendant, Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Company of New York ("BBC"), through its representative 
Rogers, to purchase twelve tons of rubber.31 Poel & Arnold contended that 
it had entered into a binding contract with BBC through its letters 
confirming an order to buy twelve tons of rubber at $2.42 per pound and that 
BBC breached this contract.32 BBC countered that Rogers did not have the 
authority to enter into such a contract and that there was no contract to begin 
with or a writing memorializing such contract to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds.33 The court assumed, without deciding, that Rogers had the 
authority to enter into such a contract and chose to focus instead on the issue 
of whether the parties had entered into a contract.34 Though the court 
acknowledged that Poel & Arnold had sent a confirmation of the order, the 
court held that BBC's subsequent letter, issued only two days later, 
constituted a counteroffer.35 The letter contained the following language: 
Goods on this order must be delivered when specified. In case you 
cannot comply, advise us by return mail stating earliest date of 
delivery you can make, and await our further orders. 
The acceptance of this order which in any event you must promptly 
acknowledge will be considered by us as a guaranty on your part of 
prompt delivery within the specified time.36 
28. I ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 3.37, at 498 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 1993); 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A 
Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1217-19 (1982) (noting that the two major problems 
that arose at common law were parties seeking to renege on deals prior to performance and disputes 
arising after performance over terms upon which the parties' forms disagreed). 
29. 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915). 
30. I CORBIN, supra note 28, § 3.37, at 497 (discussing the decision and noting that it is 
frequently cited and criticized). But see Baird & Weisberg, supra 28, at 1233-35 (commenting that, 
in reality, courts did not often apply the "mirror image" rule mechanically and were unsympathetic 
towards parties' attempts to escape from a deal by pointing to discrepancies between the offer and 
acceptance). 
31. See Poe/, II 0 N .E. at 620-21. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. at 620. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. at 621. 
36. See id. at 621. 
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At the outset, the court noted that Poel and Arnold's initial letter did not 
constitute a contract by itself, but was an offer to enter into a contract. 37 
Essentially relying on the common law "mirror-image" doctrine, the court 
found that instead of accepting Poel and Arnold's offer, BBC responded 
with the above letter, which the court viewed as BBC's own proposal or 
counteroffer.38 The court first noted that the counteroffer's language 
specifying the time to be delivered and the associated guarantee added 
nothing to Poel and Arnold's proposae9 But, the court then held that the 
other condition in BBC's letter, that the offer was conditional upon the 
receipt of the order being promptly acknowledged, was a new term and thus 
the proposal was a rejection ofPoel and Arnold's letter and a counteroffer.40 
Thus, because Poel and Arnold did not acknowledge the receipt of this 
order, BBC's proposal remained unaccepted.41 
The absurdity of this result is patent. The only difference of any 
consequence between Poel and Arnold's offer and BBC's "counteroffer" 
was that BBC wanted acknowledgement of the order, but Poel and Arnold 
had already acknowledged the order on the very same terms with its initial 
"offer."42 It was obvious that they wanted to go forward with the agreement 
on the offered terms. The reality of the case was not that the deal went awry 
because of the variance between the offer and acceptance; instead, BBC 
wanted to escape from the deal because changed market conditions had 
made the deal unprofitable.43 The variance in terms between the offers 
became an issue as an excuse for nonperformance only after BBC had 
repudiated the agreement.44 It was this case, and others like it, that led the 
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code to devise section 2-207 in a way 
that would prevent reneging on an agreement that was commercially 
understood to have been made, simply due to minor variations between the 
offer and acceptance.45 
37. Seeid.at621. 
38. ld. 
39. See id. at 622. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
43. See I CORBIN, supra note 28, § 3.37, at 497-98. 
44. /d. at 498. 
45. /d. 
509 
B. The Development of Section 2-207 
The primary goal of the drafters of section 2-207 was to avoid situations 
whereby minor differences between offer and acceptance--differences that 
were not raised prior to the dispute-allowed one party to renege on a 
contract due to issues unrelated to the issue of offer and acceptance.46 
Section 2-207 was designed to effectuate the parties' intent and thereby to 
surmount the technical difficulties posed by the use of preprinted forms. 47 
This is accomplished through subsection (1) of section 2-207.48 
Subsection ( 1) provides that the sending of preprinted forms, such as a 
written confirmation, operates as an acceptance "even though it states terms 
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless 
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or 
different terms. "49 Thus, the rigid common law "mirror image rule" has 
given way to a more realistic approach to contract formation. However, the 
last proviso would at least appear to be a nod to the common law roots of the 
section by invoking the "rule that a conditional acceptance is not an effective 
acceptance."50 Section 2-207 generally works well in determining whether a 
contract has been formed, though issues can still arise as to whether a 
written offer has been made, whether there has been a definite expression of 
acceptance and whether the acceptance was conditional. 51 
46. See I CORBIN, supra note 28, § 3.37, at 499; see also Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative 
Envtl. Equip. Co., 697 A.2d 323, 327 (R.I. 1997) (noting that section 2-207 was intended to alter the 
common law mirror-image rule). 
47. Brown, supra note 14, at 899. This also comports with the Uniform Commercial Code's 
policy regarding the general formation of contracts as articulated in § 2-204, which states: 
(I) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show 
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a 
contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though 
the moment of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
U.C.C. § 2-204 (2004); see also Brown, supra note 14, at 899. 
48. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 319. 
49. U.C.C. § 2-207(1). Though§ 2-207 does not explicitly limit itself to agreements in which at 
least one party's preprinted form plays a role, such a limitation is generally understood. Brown, 
supra note 14, at 899. 
50. Brown, supra note 14, at 919. Though some courts, such as Rota-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & 
Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962) and its progeny, have held that a reply term that materially 
alters the contract must constitute an acceptance "expressly made conditional" on the offeror's 
assent to the new term, this approach has been criticized as frustrating the purposes of § 2-207. 
Brown, supra note 14, at 919-20 n.l24. 
51. See I CORBIN, supra note 28, § 3.37, at 499, 501-03. There may also be limits on what will 
constitute an acceptance, such as when the confirmation states entirely different terms as to quantity 
and price. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 319-21. "[S]urely a buyer should not be 
taken to accept the seller's offer of two carloads at $10,000 each if the buyer replies, 'I accept one 
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Once a contract has been formed under subsection (1 ), subsection (2) 
governs the question of which terms of the writings are included in the 
contract.52 As subsection (1) is viewed as having given substantial power 
back to the offeror in the "battle of the forms," the drafters added a sop to 
the offeree in subsection (2). 53 When both parties are merchants, the drafters 
recognized that the offeree could be extended some latitude to set new terms 
so long as the new terms did not significantly alter the bargain proposed in 
the offer.54 Accordingly, subsection (2) provides that, between merchants,55 
additional terms56 are to be construed as proposals to the contract and 
become a part of the contract unless: "(a) the offer expressly limits 
acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) 
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a 
reasonable time after notice of them is received."57 But the exceptions to the 
rule, found in subsections (2)(a) and (2)(c), reserve to the offeror the 
common law power to set terms by so stipulating in the offer or by objecting 
before or after the fact. 58 
carload at $5,000. "' !d. at 321. Variance in such terms, which are usually subject to bargaining, 
may not be viewed as "expressions of acceptance." !d.; see also, e.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 
1110,1113 (lstCir.I993). 
52. See Brown, supra note 14, at 928; I CORBIN, supra note 28, § 3.37, at 504. As a matter of 
grammatical construction, subsection (2) presupposes that a contract has been formed under 
subsection (I). See 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 6:22, at 193 
(Richard A. Lord 4th ed. 1990). 
53. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 322. 
54. See Brown, supra note 14, at 931. 
55. Corbin instructs that if either party is a non-merchant, the additional or different terms drop 
out of the contract and have no further relevance unless expressly agreed to. I CORBIN, supra note 
28, § 3.37, at 505. See also Stephens, supra note 23, at 825 (noting that if the transaction is not 
between merchants, the additional terms in the offeree's response do not become a part of the 
contract, but rather are treated as proposals for addition to the contract). 
56. There appears to be some disagreement as to whether subsection (2) deals exclusively with 
additional terms or with additional and different terms. See Brown, supra note 14, at 930-33 
(advocating that only additional terms are covered by subsection (2)). Though the text of subsection 
(2) speaks only in terms of"additional terms," the comments to§ 2-207 state that "[w]hether or not 
additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of 
subsection (2)." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt 3 (2004) (emphasis added). Some commentators and courts 
have suggested that the omission of the word "different" from the text was a typographical error and 
that subsection (2) does apply to different terms. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle 
of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1307, 1354-56 (I 986); Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 
741 F.2d 1569, 1578-79 (lOth Cir. 1984). Other commentators have pointed out that the drafters 
could have just as easily inserted "or different" into subsection (2) had they wanted to and that it is 
doubtful that the omission was inadvertent. See I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3, at I 0. 
57. Brown, supra note 14, at 825 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207(2)). 
58. See id. 
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Under subsection (2)(a), an offeree who receives an offer that expressly 
limits acceptance to its terms cannot add terms and hope to have them 
survive, but may choose to send its own "acceptance ... made conditional 
on the acceptance of [its own] additional or different terms."59 Such an 
acceptance may actually be viewed as a counteroffer and no contract will be 
formed unless the offeror accepts the counteroffer.60 However, in response 
to this faux acceptance, the offeror may move forward under the assumption 
that a contract has been made on the offeror's terms.6I Though this would 
seem to restore the "last shot" doctrine, subsection (3) establishes that, even 
though the exchange of writings has not established a contract, the offeree is 
still bound by a contract consisting of the terms common to both writings, 
together with any other terms supplied by the Uniform Commercial Code. 62 
Even if an offeror remains completely silent on additional terms, an 
offeree is still limited by subsection (2)(b ), which prevents additions that 
would materially alter the contract.63 Accordingly, this subsection has 
further accomplished the goal of the drafters to erode the "last shot doctrine" 
by preventing material last shot boilerplate additions that may have been 
otherwise overlooked by the parties. But determining whether a term 
materially alters the contract is a complex matter.64 
C. "Material Alteration" Under Section 2-207 
Assuming neither subsection (2)(a) or (2)(c) apply, the only issue 
remaining when an offeree adds terms is whether the complained-of 
provisions materially alter the contract. The commentary to section 2-207 
gives some guidance as to what terms become a part of the contract and 
59. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2; I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 327. 
60. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 327-29; I WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, 
§ 1-3, at 17. Though the mere presence of additional terms, without any conditional acceptance 
language, should not indicate that the offeree's acceptance is a counteroffer, some courts have held 
otherwise. See, e.g., Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962); 
Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Sargent & Greenleaf, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 680, 686-87 (D.R.l. 
1992); Middleton Eng'g Co. v. Climate Conditioning Co., 810 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); 
Alloy Computer Prods., Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D. Mass 1988); Gilbert & 
Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Mass. 1977). But see 
Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 524 F. Supp. 546, 551-52 (D. Del 1981) (criticizing the 
Rota-Lith decision); Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1981) (rejecting Rota-Lith as reviving the common law "mirror image rule"). White and Summers 
reject such an approach and would consider the offeree's document as an acceptance. I WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3, at 17. 
61. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 328-29. 
62. !d. at 329. 
63. !d. at 322-23. 
64. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 52, § 6.22, at 193 ("[I]t remains no easy matter to determine 
whether a particular term in the offeree's expression of acceptance materially alters the contract 
formed under subsection (I), by that expression of acceptance."). 
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what terms are material alterations.65 For instance, comment 4 clarifies what 
terms do in fact materially alter a contract, stating, 
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially 
alter" the contract and so result in surprise or hardship if 
incorporated without express awareness by the other party are: a 
clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchantability 
or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which either 
warranty normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of 90% or 
100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery, where the 
usage of the trade allows greater quantity leeways; a clause 
reserving to the seller the power to cancel upon the buyer's failure 
to meet any invoice when due; a clause requiring that complaints be 
made in a time materially shorter than customary or reasonable.66 
This comment indicates that the test for materiality rests upon whether a 
clause would impose "surprise or hardship" upon the party against whom the 
clause is sought to be enforced. The comment also instructs, however, that 
such clauses cannot be incorporated without "express awareness."67 Thus, if 
an offeree's clause that materially alters a contract is specifically pointed out 
to the offeror, the ·offeror can protect himself from unfair surprise or 
hardship by objecting to it.68 Relying on section 2-207 comment 4, courts 
have found the following clauses to be material alterations to a contract: a 
choice of law clause;69 a choice of forum clause; 70 a clause disclaiming 
65. Comment 3 to § 2-207 states that unless expressly agreed to by the other party, materially 
altering terms will not be included in the contract. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (2004). 
66. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4. 
67. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 52,§ 6:22, at 201-03 (noting that though the comments to§ 2-207 
provide that materially altering terms must be "expressly agreed to," the comments also suggest that 
what is really necessary is "express awareness"). 
68. See, e.g., Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that though an express warranty and accompanying disclaimer were material alterations, because the 
purchaser had actual knowledge of the disclaimer, had inquired about it and took advantage of the 
warranties benefits, he had expressed assent, through his conduct, to the addition); see also Clifford-
Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 437 N.E.2d 22, 25 (III. App. 1982) (finding that 
though a price term was an addition to the contract, there was no unreasonableness or surprise 
because the price increase sought to effectuate a term upon which both parties' contracts were in 
agreement); cf Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(holding an arbitration clause was not a material alteration in light of the parties' course of dealing). 
69. See Dassault Falcon Jet Corp. v. Oberflex, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 345, 352 (M.D.N.C. 1995) 
(finding that, under North Carolina law, a choice of law provision was a material alteration to the 
contract where both parties included differing choice of law provisions). But see Liberty Steel 
Prods., Inc. v. Franco Steel Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (N.D. Ohio I999) (finding that an Ohio 
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warranties/1 a clause providing for attorney's fees; 72 a clause for 
indemnification; 73 a clause changing the price term; 74 a clause changing 
quantities to be shipped in an installment contract/5 a clause adding 
warranties when the offer expressly negated them; 76 and a clause that deletes 
a major remedy, such as consequential damages.77 
seller's provision for New York choice of law did not "materially alter" the contract because it was 
not listed in the commentary as a term that would impose surprise and hardship). 
70. See Dependable Component Supply, Inc. v. Pace Elec. Inc., 772 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) ("An exclusive venue provision outside one's home area seems both material, as well 
as a variance, especially where, as here, the provision would send buyer up to seller's court in a suit 
to recover the price already paid for nonconforming goods."); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Moton 
Motors & Coil, Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (App. Div. 1984) (finding a condition specifying New 
York jurisdiction to be a material alteration). See also Prod. Components, Inc. v. Regency Door & 
Hardware, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 651, 654 (S.D. Ind. 1983). In the Product Components case the court 
stated that: 
This Court likewise concludes that selection of a distant forum with which a party has no 
contacts, while enforceable if contained in an agreement freely and consciously entered 
into, can result in surprise and hardship if permitted to become effective by way of 
confirmation forms that unfortunately are all too often never read. 
/d. at 654. 
71. See Tuck Indus., Inc. v. Reichhold Chems, Inc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (App. Div. 1989) 
(finding that a warranty disclaimer was a material alteration to the contract and thus not a part of the 
agreement between the parties); Se. Adhesives Co. v. Funder Am., Inc., 366 S.E.2d 505, 508 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1988) ("A term [disclaiming warranties] which so drastically affects the remedies available 
to the buyer upon seller's breach must be considered a material alteration when not explicitly 
negotiated by the parties."). 
72. See Herzog Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Otto Torpedo Co., 570 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990) ("[W]e find that the provision calling for the addition of an attorney's fee of 25% of the 
balance due is a material alteration and, therefore, did not become part of the agreement."); Johnson 
Tire Serv., Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521, 523 (Utah 1980) ("The addition of a provision for 
attorneys' fees alters the offer materially and thus does not fall within the 'additional or different 
terms' which the statute renders acceptable by mere silence on the part of the offeror."). 
73. See Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chern. Co., 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995) (applying 
Washington law). 
74. See Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding trial court's determination that a term altering the delivery terms was a material 
alteration). 
75. Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751, 754 (Cal. 1977) (holding that defendant's 
substitution of a guaranteed discount amourit of gasoline terminable at its discretion materially 
effected plaintiff's interests). As noted above, altering terms such as quantity and price may vary so 
much from the original offer that they will actually be considered counteroffers and thus subsection 
(2) would not be applicable. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
76. See Valtrol, Inc. v. Gen. Connectors Corp., 884 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that 
purchase order warranties that were additional terms materially altered the existing contract); Boese-
Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("Basic logic compels 
the conclusion that if a clause negating a standard warranty constitutes a 'material' alteration, 
conversely, inclusion of a warranty clause where none previously existed and was expressly 
disclaimed likewise constitutes a 'material' alteration."). 
77. See Glyptal Inc. v. Engelhard Corp., 801 F. Supp. 887, 894 (D. Mass. 1992) (claiming to 
follow the recent trend in case law to find that remedy-limiting provisions are material alterations); 
W. Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Can., Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that "[t]he 
deletion of a major remedy would be a material alteration"); Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Ky. Elec. 
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The comments also give guidance as to what terms do not materially 
alter a contract in comment 5, which states, 
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable 
surprise and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract 
unless notice of objection is seasonably given are: a clause setting 
forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon the seller's exemption due 
to supervening causes beyond his control, similar to those covered 
by the provision of this Article on merchant's excuse by failure of 
presupposed conditions or a clause fixing in advance any reasonable 
formula of proration under such circumstances; a clause fixing a 
reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or in the 
case of a purchase for sub-sale, providing for inspection by the sub-
purchaser; a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or 
fixing the seller's standard credit terms where they are within the 
range of trade practice and do not limit any credit bargained for; a 
clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall within the 
customary trade tolerances for acceptance "with adjustment" or 
otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable manner (see Sections 2-
718 and 2-719).78 
Of particular interest is the reference to section 2-719. U.C.C. section 2-719 
deals with limitations on remedies and on consequential damages and 
provides, 
(l) Subject to the provlSlons of subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of 
damages, 
Steel Co., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1430, 1433 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that a clause disallowing 
consequential damages or restricting warranties is a material alteration); Album Graphics, Inc. v. 
Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("A term disclaiming warranties, 
and we might add a term limiting remedies, is undoubtedly a term that materially alters a contract."); 
Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414, 424-25 (Wis. 1973) ("We 
conclude that the disclaimer for consequential loss was sufficiently material to require express 
conversation between the parties over its inclusion or exclusion in the contract."). See also 2 
WILLISTON, supra note 52, § 6:22, at 207-13 (noting that, by and large, courts have not had great 
difficulty dealing with the issue of whether a clause materially alters a contract formed under 
subsection (I)). Arbitration clauses have also been generally recognized as being material 
alterations except when the trade is one in which such clauses are the norm, and therefore do not 
result in surprise and hardship. See id. 
78. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (2004). 
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(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in 
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or 
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as 
by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and 
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts; and 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy 
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole 
remedy. 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to 
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this 
Act. 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of 
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of 
damages where the loss is commercial is not. 79 
Comment 5 to section 2-207 indicates that limiting a remedy in a 
"reasonable manner" is permissible and references 2-719. As the only limits 
imposed under section 2-719 are that the remedy not fail of its essential 
purpose or, in the case of consequential limitations, be unconscionable, this 
would seem to indicate that limiting remedies would not be a material 
alteration so long as the exclusions of section 2-719 do not apply. 80 But, as 
was noted above, clauses eliminating major remedies, such as excluding 
consequential damages, have been found to be material alterations.81 
Indeed, as will be discussed below, despite the dictates of comment 5, some 
courts have held that such attempts to limit remedies are always material 
alterations while others find that they are not. 
Ill. CURRENT APPROACHES TO WHETHER CLAUSES LIMITING LIABILITY ARE 
"MATERIAL ALTERATIONS" 
Many courts have confronted the issue of whether a clause limiting 
liability is a material alteration to the contract under 2-207. Unfortunately, 
courts have arrived upon varying approaches and results. Courts have 
adopted both a per se rejection of such provisions, finding them always to be 
79. u.c.c. § 2-719. 
80. See U.C.C. § 2-719(2)-{3). 
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
516 
[Vol. 33: 501, 2006] The Limits of Limiting Liability in the Battle ofthe Forms 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
material, and a per se acceptance of such provisions, finding them not to be 
material.82 There is also a middle ground of cases which adopt a case-by-
case approach to this issue, looking to whether the clause would result in 
surprise and hardship. 
A. The "Per Se Material" Approach 
Under this approach, courts seemingly ignore the language in the latter 
part of comment 5 to section 2-207. This line of cases instead focuses on the 
"surprise or hardship" factors found in comment 4.83 These cases find that 
the limitation of remedies causes a significant and substantial shift in the 
ordinary allocation of risk, and such clauses therefore always cause a 
hardship. 84 
Such was the case in Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. 85 
In Winter Panel, the plaintiff, Winter Panel ordered from the defendant, 
Reichhold Chemicals ("Reichhold"), a polyurethane foam system to be used 
in Winter Panel's production process for its foam-insulated construction 
panels.86 Reichhold, over a period of several months, delivered chemicals to 
Winter Panel and included with its deliveries invoices limiting its liability 
for breach of warranty and disclaiming liability for consequential damages. 87 
After production with the Reichhold foam, Winter Panel's customers began 
82. This is not meant to imply that clauses limiting liability are the only ones which courts treat 
in a per se manner. For instance, many courts have held that the addition of an arbitration clause is a 
per se material alteration. See, e.g., Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Envtl.. Equip. Co., 697 
A.2d 323, 329 (R.I. 1997) (stating that"[ w ]e are of the opinion that a provision compelling a party to 
submit to binding arbitration materially alters the terms of the parties' agreement."); Coastal Indus., 
Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375,379 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying New York law to 
find that "the unilateral insertion of an arbitration clause constitutes a per se material alteration of a 
contract"). Material alteration in the context of limitation ofliability clauses is of particular interest, 
however, because courts have taken such polar opposite approaches as well as a middle ground 
approach. 
83. Comment 4 indicates that "clauses which would normally 'materially alter"' a contract are 
ones that "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other 
party." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4. 
84. See, e.g., Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 963, 97I (D. Mass. 1993); Glyptal 
Inc. v. Engelhard Corp., 801 F. Supp. 887, 894 (D. Mass. 1992); Reliance Steel Prod. Co. v. Ky. 
Elec. Steel Co., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1430, 1433 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice 
Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980); Air Prods. & Chems, Inc. v. Fairbanks 
Morse, Inc., 206 N.W.2d 414,424-25 (Wis. 1973). 
85. 823 F. Supp. at 963. 
86. See id. at 966. 
87. See id. Reichhold also sent technical bulletins containing warranty and damages limitation 
clauses. /d. at 967. 
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to complain that its panels were warping, forcing Winter Panel to replace 
and repair the faulty panels.88 Winter Panel sued Reichhold for breach of 
warranty and for consequential damages, and Reichhold defended that such 
claims were precluded by the terms of the damages limitation clauses.89 The 
district court held that a fact issue remained as to whether the invoices were 
received prior to or subsequent to delivery of the chemicals,90 but also held 
that Reichhold's clauses were material alterations to the contract.91 The 
court found that terms which cause a shift of the commercial risk, though 
common in commercial dealings and expressly allowed under U.C.C. 
section 2-719, "must be considered significant terms in any contract, which 
would result in surprise or potential hardship if incorporated without express 
awareness by the buyer."92 In holding that such clauses are material 
alterations, the court purported to follow a prevailing trend that damages 
limitations clauses are potentially too burdensome not to be considered 
material. 93 
The Third Circuit reached a similar result in Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. 
v. Repco, Inc. 94 There, a security business that purchased radio-operated 
security systems brought suit against the manufacturer to recover the 
purchase price of two of the systems, and also for incidental and 
consequential damages. 95 The defendant appealed an award in favor of the 
plaintiff based, among other things, on the grounds that consequential 
damages were precluded by the defendant's invoice forms, which stated, 
"sellers shall not be liable for any incidental or consequential damages 
incurred by buyer or anyone else by reason of product defects or failure to 
conform to specifications."96 After determining that the clause's inclusion 
turned solely upon whether the exclusion of consequential damages would 
materially alter their contract, the Third Circuit rejected defendants' 
argument, stating, "Defendant's additional terms would operate to prevent 
plaintiffs from taking advantage of the remedies otherwise available to them 
88. See id. at 968. 
89. See id. at 968-69. 
90. The court held that, under Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 
1962), warranty and damages limitation clauses included in acknowledgments of purchase orders are 
incorporated into the final contract when the purchaser subsequently accepts delivery of goods. !d. 
at 969. Winter Panel contended, however, that it did not receive the invoices until after delivery of 
the chemicals, thus raising a factual issue. !d. The court held that if the invoices were received after 
delivery then the clauses would be subject to U.C.C.§ 2-207(2) and would be considered proposals 
for additional terms. !d. at 970. 
91. See id. at 969-71. 
92. !d. at 971. 
93. !d. 
94. 957 F .2d II 02 (3d Cir. I992). 
95. See id. at II 04. 
96. !d. at II07. 
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under Pennsylvania law. It follows that inclusion of the additional terms in 
the contract would constitute a material alteration."97 
Though this approach is straightforward and easy to apply, it is flawed 
in that it ignores both the realities under which the parties may be operating 
as well as comment 5 to section 2-207.98 Turning back to our soccer club 
and polystyrene hypotheticals, application of a per se material rule would 
appear to reap a just result for the soccer club, but reveals the inadequacies 
of the rule when applied to the sophisticated parties in the polystyrene 
example.99 Suppose it was common in the polystyrene industry to include 
such clauses or that Company B could have obtained polystyrene from 
another source just as easily. The rule is hardly fair under such 
circumstances, because it would not cause surprise or hardship for the 
opposing party. Because such a rule allows a party to escape the terms of a 
contract that the parties have arguably agreed to, such a rule also violates the 
policies underlying the move from the common law to the U.C.C., i.e., it 
allows one party to renege on part of the bargain based on discrepancies 
between the offer and acceptance. Furthermore, as comment 5 clearly 
contemplates whether limitations clauses may not be material alterations, the 
per se material model is not a sound approach. 100 
B. The "Per Se Not Material" Approach 
This approach arguably takes the most straightforward approach in that 
it unwaveringly follows the comments and section 2-719. It follows 
comment 5 to section 2-207 which states, in relevant part: 
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable 
surprise and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract 
unless notice of objection is seasonably given are: . . . a clause 
limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall within the 
customary trade tolerances for acceptance "with adjustment" or 
otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable manner (see Sections 2-
718 and 2-719). 101 
97. /d. at 1108. 
98. See U.C.C. cmt. 5 (2004). 
99. See supra Part I. 
100. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5. 
101. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5 (emphasis added). 
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U.C.C. section 2-719, to which the comment refers, deals with limitations on 
remedies and on consequential damages, and provides that such limitations 
are permissible so long as the exclusive or limited remedy does not fail of its 
essential purpose, or, in the case of limiting consequential damages, that the 
limit is not unconscionable. 102 Therefore, a literal reading of the U.C.C. 
appears to provide a straightforward approach to whether such clauses are 
material alterations Comment 5 of section 2-207 renders clauses limiting 
consequential damages reasonable, and directs the parties to section 2-
719.103 
Under this latter provision, limitations on remedies, including 
consequential damages, are reasonable as a matter of law, and do 
not materially alter the parties' agreement, unless the limitation on 
the remedy, such as to repair or replacement, fails of its essential 
purpose, or the limitation on consequential damages is 
unconscionable. 104 
When the parties to the contract at issue are both sophisticated entities, 
unconsionability should not be an issue, and, under this approach, a 
limitation of liability provision would most likely be found not material. 
This approach was adopted by the District Court of New Jersey in 
Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores. 105 In Kathenes, Nancy Kathenes was 
injured when the cap of a soda bottle flew off and struck her in the eye. 106 
She sued the retailer as well as the bottler, Joyce Beverages, and the 
manufacturer of the bottle, Owens-Illinois. 107 A state court entered 
judgment against Joyce and dismissed the claims against the retailer and 
Owens. 108 The only claims remaining were Joyce's claims for indemnity 
from Owens. 109 
The case was removed to federal court and Owens moved for summary 
judgment based on language in its order acknowledgment form limiting 
liability to the contract price and excluding liability for special or 
102. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2)-(3). 
103. See U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 5. 
104. Chateaugay Corp. v. N. States Contracting Co., 162 B.R. 949, 956 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
see also, e.g., Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores, 596 F. Supp. 713 (D.N.J. 1984); Hydraform 
Prod. Corp. v. Am. Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985) (finding that clause was not 
unconscionable but did fail its essential purpose, and was therefore a material alteration); J.A. 
Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co., 1970 WL 12645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 1970). 
105. 596 F. Supp. 713 (D.N.J. 1984). 
106. Id. at 714. 
107. !d. 
108. Seeid. 
109. Seeid. 
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consequential damages. 110 After determining that Ohio law applied, the 
court turned to the question of whether the clause was a material alteration 
of the contract. 111 Though Joyce contended that such a clause was a material 
alteration, the court noted that comment 5 allows for such limitations so long 
as they are reasonable under section 2-719. 112 The court then rejected 
Joyce's contentions that the remedy provided in the clause failed its essential 
purpose or was unconscionable. 113 The court found that there was no 
indication that the remedy failed of its essential purpose because its purpose 
"was to shift the unpredictable risk of consequential damages to Joyce," and 
was not so oppressive as to be unconscionable. 114 
Not all clauses survive the dictates of section 2-719, however, despite 
being found to be a part of the contract under the per se not material 
approach. For instance, in Hydraform Products Corp. v. American Steel & 
Aluminum Corp., the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that though a 
term limiting liability was enforceable as a term of the contract, it failed of 
its own essential purpose. 115 There, a wood stove manufacturer, Hydraform, 
brought suit against a steel seller, American, for breach of contract. 116 
Hydraform had ordered steel from American but some deliveries were late 
and other deliveries had defective steel. 117 Furthermore, the replacement 
deliveries were also late. 118 After the first deliveries arrived late, Hydraform 
informed American of the importance of timely deliveries, but American 
continued its tardy course of conduct. 119 Ultimately, Hydraform "concluded 
that American would never perform as agreed and brought suit."120 
American defended that its delivery receipts contained language limiting its 
liability to replacement or refund of the purchase price and excluding 
consequential damages. 121 
110. ld. 
I I I. !d. at 716. Though the court analyzed the case under Ohio law, it noted that its decision 
would be the same under New Jersey law because New Jersey's version of 2-207 was identical to 
Ohio's. ld. at 716 n.2. 
112. See id. 
113. Seeid.at717. 
114. /d.at717-18. 
115. 498 A.2d 339, 344 (N.H. 1985). 
116. Seeid.at341. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. !d. at 341. Hydraform did attempt to mitigate its damages by seeking another supplier but 
could not find one that could supply the required steel in time. Id. 
121. See id. at 342. 
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The court considered this clause in light of section 2-207, noting that the 
clause would become a part of the contract so long as it was not a material 
alteration. 122 After noting that "comment 4 to section 2-207 implies that the 
test for material alteration is whether the term in question would result in 
surprise or hardship," the court concluded that under comment 5, a term that 
is reasonable under sections 2-718 and 2-719 is not unreasonably 
surprising. 123 The court then turned to whether the clause was 
unconscionable under section 2-719, and concluded that the parties did not 
have such disparate bargaining power as to lead to the conclusion that the 
term was unconscionable, nor did the dealings of the parties support such a 
conclusion. 124 However, the court then turned to whether the remedy in the 
clause failed of its essential purpose and concluded that it did. 125 The court 
found that although the "purpose of the clause was to limit the right to seek 
consequential damages," it was "subject to American's obligation to provide 
replacements as a remedy for defective goods." 126 Because time was of the 
essence in the shipment, delays of replacement shipments negated the 
adequacy of the remedy and therefore, the remedy failed of its essential 
purpose. 127 
Though limitations clauses are not always incorporated into the contract, 
the per se not material approach may still take comment 5 too literally. 128 
By ignoring the "surprise or hardship" language, this approach permits 
clauses which may not have been truly contemplated by both parties to 
become a part of the contract. For example, turning back to our two 
hypotheticals, it would appear to be unfair to allow such a clause to become 
a part of the soccer league's contract, especially if there was no prior course 
of dealing. 129 Even in our polystyrene hypothetical, this approach could be 
unfair and work surprise and hardship. If Company A and B had previously 
entered into fifty such contracts without Company A adding the limitations, 
and only the last contract contained this clause, the parties' course of 
conduct could indicate that the clause was an unexpected addition. Under 
such circumstances, even sophisticated parties could be surprised by the 
application of a limitation of liability. Allowing such clauses to per se 
become a part of the contract would further act to defeat the very purpose of 
122. See id. at 343. 
123. !d. 
124. !d. at 343-44. In examining unconscionability, the court referred to § 2-302, which seeks to 
prevent '"oppression and unfair surprise,"' but does not disturb the '"allocation of risks because of 
superior bargaining power."' !d. at 343 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt 1). 
125. See id. at 344-45. 
126. !d. at 344. 
127. See id. 
128. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 52,§ 6:22, at 206-07 (criticizing Kathenes and Hyrdaform). 
129. However, under this approach, a court might find that such a clause failed of its essential 
purpose, just as in Hydraform. 
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U.C.C. section 2-207 by effectively reinstituting the "last shot doctrine."130 
Just as a court should not assume that a particular clause mentioned in 
comment 4 effects a material alteration, it should not automatically assume 
the converse of a provision mentioned in comment 5. 131 
C. The "Surprise or Hardship" Approach 
The third approach rejects both per se approaches as "contrary to the 
[U.C.C. 's] special emphasis on the particular circumstances surrounding 
each contractual relationship."132 These cases analyze the issue of material 
alteration using a case-by-case basis. 133 Under this approach, the party 
opposing the limitation bears the burden of proving either surprise or 
hardship. 134 Like the cases in the per se material approach above, these 
cases concentrate on comment 4's language of"surprise or hardship," but go 
through a more thorough analysis on a case-by-case basis. 135 
1. The Horning I and II Approach 
The "surprise or hardship" approach was utilized in Dale R. Horning 
Company, Inc. v. Falconer Glass Industries, Inc. ("Horning f'). 136 In 
Horning I, Architectural Glass & Metal Company ("AGM") verbally 
ordered a type of glass containing ceramic backing from Falconer Glass. 137 
The next day, Falconer sent AGM a form confirming their oral agreement 
with a stated price quotation; the form also contained sixteen different 
"Terms and Conditions of Sale" on the back. 138 One of these terms limited 
AGM's remedies to replacement and "excluded any special, direct, indirect, 
130. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2004). 
131. See 2 WILLISTON, supra note 52, § 6:22, at 207. 
132. Bergquist Co. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
133. See Chateaugay Corp. v. LTV Energy Prod. Co., 162 B.R. 949,956 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
see also, e.g., Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 765 (lOth Cir. 1983); Dale R. 
Homing Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 693, 701 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Wheaton Glass 
Co. v. Pharmex, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (D.N.J. 1982). 
134. See Comark Merch., Inc. v. Highland Group, Inc., 932 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Bergquist, 777 F. Supp. at 1245 n.ll; Horning, 730 F. Supp. at 966 n.2 (S.D.Ind. 1990). But see 
Westech Eng'g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 199 n.3 (Tex. App. 1992) 
(placing the burden on the offeree but noting that the burden is very light). 
135. See, e.g., Comark Merch., 932 F.2d at 1201; Bergquist, 777 F. Supp. at 1245 n.ll; Horning, 
730 F. Supp. at 966 n.2. 
136. 710 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Ind. 1989) ("Horning f'). 
137. See id. at 695. 
138. /d. 
523 
incidental or consequential damages." 139 Falconer subsequently delivered 
the glass to AGM but the glass was defective. 14° Falconer agreed to replace 
the goods but did not do so for five months, causing AGM to suffer 
consequential damages in the amount of $19,000. 141 AGM brought suit 
against Falconer for its breach, 142 and Falconer defended that AGM could 
not recover for consequential damages under its limitation of liability 
clause. 143 
In analyzing whether the clause became a part of the contract, the court 
turned to section 2-207 and examined whether such a clause was a material 
alteration. 144 The court noted that other courts had come to different 
conclusions about whether such clauses were, or were not, material 
alterations. 145 Ultimately, the court concluded, however, that it could not 
make such a determination as a matter of law, because the focus under the 
language of section 2-207 is whether the new term would surprise or work 
hardship on the buyer and this was an issue for the trier of fact. 146 The court 
concluded that because Falconer had not established that the limitation of 
consequential damages was a part of the contract, its motion to dismiss 
should be denied. 147 
However, the issue arose again after more evidence had been 
presented. 148 This time, the court delved more deeply into the "surprise or 
hardship" analysis, and concluded that AGM had not shown that the 
disclaimer of consequential damages was a surprise. 149 The court did not 
end its analysis there, but went on to examine whether the exclusion worked 
a hardship upon AGM. 150 The court concluded that it did because Falconer 
knew or had reason to know of AGM's potential liability and "attempted to 
shift this substantial economic burden" onto AGM through boilerplate 
language. 151 Thus the clause was not a part of the contract. 152 
139. !d. at 695-96. 
140. See id. at 696. 
141. Seeid. 
142. Seeid. 
143. See id. at 699. 
144. See id. at 699-700. 
145. See id. at 700. 
146. See id. at 700-0 I. 
147. See id. at 70 I. 
148. See Dale R. Homing Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc. , 730 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ind. 1990) 
(Horning II). 
149. !d. at 966-97. 
150. See id. at 967. 
151. !d. at 967-68. 
152. See id. at 967. 
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2. Defining "Surprise or Hardship" 
Though the court in Horning I initially placed the burden on the 
defendant to show that the clause was a part of the contract, it later placed 
the burden on the party opposing the limitation to show "surprise or 
hardship," an approach adopted by other courts as well. 153 No matter which 
party bears the burden of proof, however, the analysis eventually turns upon 
whether there is "surprise or hardship," two words the U.C.C. leaves 
undefined154 but which have been given meaning via case law. 155 
"Surprise" means that "[a]n alteration is material if consent to it cannot 
be presumed."156 "It consists of both a subjective and objective element; 
what did the assenting party know and what should it have known."157 
Factors bearing on this issue include the parties' prior course of dealing and 
the number of written confirmations that they exchanged, industry custom 
and the conspicuousness of the term. 158 
"Hardship" has been interpreted as "substantial economic hardship," and 
involves "a shift in legal liability which has the effect of relieving one party 
of the potential for significant economic hardship". 159 
Where a buyer faces substantial potential liability for consequential 
damages if the seller delays delivery or delivers a defective product, 
and the seller knew or had reason to know [of this potential 
liability], the seller's attempt to 'shift this substantial economic 
burden back to [the buyer] not through negotiation, but instead by 
inserting fine print boilerplate on the reverse side of a confirming 
standard form' imposes hardship. 160 
153. Compare Dale R. Homing Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc. 710 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Ind. 
1989) (Horning/) with Horning ll, 730 F. Supp. at 966; see also Chateaugay Corp. v. N. States 
Contracting Co., 162 B.R. 949, 958 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the party seeking to avoid 
the clause had failed to come forward with evidence regarding surprise and thus the clause became a 
part of the contract). 
154. u.c.c. § 2-207 (2004). 
155. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. 
156. Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1991). 
157. Chateaugay Corp. v. N. States Contracting Co., 162 B.R. 949, 956-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1994); see also Am. Ins. Co. v. El Paso Pipe & Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1185, 1191 (lOth Cir. 1992). 
158. See Am. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d at 1191. 
159. Trans-Aire Int'l, Inc. v. N. Adhesive Co., 882 F.2d 1254, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989). 
160. Chateaugay, 162 B.R. at 957 (citing Dale R. Homing Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc., 730 
F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (Horning//}). Interestingly, this logic is similar to the reasoning 
used by the Hydraform court in determining that the limitation clause failed in its essential purpose. 
See Hydraform Prod. Corp. v. Am. Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 344 (1985) (finding no 
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It is under this second prong that most courts find the exclusion of 
consequential damages to be material, 161 in part because the definition used 
for hardship is so broad. Some cases have recognized this, however, and 
have spoken in language designed to ensure that the exception does not 
swallow the rule. 162 For instance, Judge Posner criticized a broad use of the 
"hardship" term in the Union Carbide case, stating that "[h]ardship is a 
consequence, not a criterion (Surprise can be either)."163 
3. The Chateaugay Approach 
The Chateaugay court seized upon Judge Posner's language when it 
formulated its own test based on this third approach. 164 In Chateaugay, the 
plaintiff and debtor, LTV Energy Products Company ("LTV"), commenced 
an adversarial proceeding against the Northern States Contracting Company 
("Northern") to recover $22,517.60 and to expunge a claim by Northern in 
the amount of $1,727,240.65. 165 Northern had entered into a contract with 
LTV for LTV to supply it with steel laminated pads and plain bearing pads 
needed in the construction of a bridge for the New York State Department of 
Transportation ("NYSDOT"). 166 To confirm the order, LTV sent to 
Northern a Sales Order Acknowledgment containing a number of clauses on 
the reverse side including clauses exculpating LTV from delay, labor-related 
or consequential damages and limiting Northern's remedies to repair or 
replacement of, or credit for, defective goods at the option of LTV. 167 
Though LTV delivered the steel laminated pads without incident, it failed to 
deliver the plain bearing pads for another year. 168 Northern accepted the late 
pads but brought claims against LTV for the consequential and delay 
damages it suffered as a result of LTV's delay in delivering conforming 
plain bearing pads. 169 LTV moved for dismissal based on the exculpatory 
language of its Sales Order Acknowledgement. 170 
error by trial court for refusing to enforce clause that did not address the problem to which it 
purportedly applied). 
161. See Trans-Aire, 882 F.2d at 1263. 
162. See Chateaugay, 162 B.R. at 957. 
163. Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 947 F.2d 133, 1336 (7th Cir. 1989). 
164. Chateaugay, 162 B.R. at 957-58. 
165. See Chateaugay, 162 B.R. at 952. 
166. Seeid. 
167. See id. at 952-53. 
168. See id. at 953. The failure to deliver the pads on time, and whether the delays were related to 
anything LTV did or did not do, was also a matter in dispute. /d. Northern had also brought claims 
against NY SOOT for the very same damages. /d. at 953 n.l. 
169. See id. at 953-54. 
170. See id. 
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The bankruptcy court, recognizing that the terms of the Sales Order 
Acknowledgement were subject to U.C.C. section 2-207, turned to whether 
the clause was a material alteration to the contract. 171 The court first 
recognized that some courts had adopted a per se acceptance of such terms 
as not being material while others had per se rejected such clauses because 
they always cause a significant and substantial shift in the ordinary 
allocation of risks. 172 The court rejected both of these approaches, however, 
as '"contrary to the U.C.C. 's special emphasis on the particular 
circumstances surrounding each contractual relationship,'" and instead 
adopted the "surprise or hardship" approach of the Horning II court. 173 
However, the court did not adopt the Horning II court's approach in full, 
recognizing that a broad definition of "hardship" would create an exception 
that swallows the rule. 174 Citing Judge Posner's approach to hardship, and 
relying upon rationale in both per se rules and the cases adopting the 
"surprise or hardship" approach, the Chateaugay court arrived upon the 
following test: 
The rule we cull from the case law is the following: Between 
merchants, where U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a) and (2)(c) do not 
apply, the limitations on remedies or damages become part of the 
parties' agreement, unless the non-assenting party proves that ( 1) its 
inclusion constitutes unreasonable surprise in light of the parties'· 
prior dealings, industry custom or inconspicuousness of the term, 
(2) the clause is unconscionable or (3) the limitation fails of its 
essential purpose. 175 
Under this test, the Chateaugay court ruled that Northern, as the party that 
was challenging the additional clauses, had failed to come forward with any 
evidence regarding surprise and had likewise failed to show that the 
remedies provided for failed of their essential purpose or were 
unconscionable. 176 
171. Seeid. at955. 
I 72. See id. at 956. 
173. !d. at 956-57 (quoting Bergquist Corp. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 
1991)). 
174. !d. at 957. 
175. Chateaugay, 162 B.R. at 957-58 (internal footnote omitted). 
176. See id. at 958-60 ("It is extremely rare for a court to find an unconscionable limitation on 
consequential damages in a contract between experienced businessmen arising in a commercial 
setting."). 
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4. The "Surprise or Hardship" Approach As Compared to the Per Se 
Approaches 
The major disadvantage to the "surprise or hardship" approach, as 
compared to the per se approaches, is that it is not as easy to apply. A court 
must actually consider the parties, their course of dealing, and industry 
custom to arrive at what is a finding of fact. A per se approach is easy to 
apply and may be more predictable, but therein lies the problem with the per 
se approaches. 177 The per se material approach, by ignoring the intention of 
the parties and industry custom, would allow parties out of a provision in a 
contract that should, in all fairness, be included. The per se not material 
approach could likewise enforce proviSIOns that were never truly 
contemplated by one or both parties and allow a party to avoid liability 
through boilerplate language. Though this effect can be mitigated somewhat 
in cases where the court considers whether the limitation fails of its essential 
purpose, this approach still ignores the factor of surprise. The "surprise or 
hardship" approach effects the purposes of the U.C.C. in that it takes into 
account the intentions of the parties and the circumstances surrounding each 
contract. 178 
177. See Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Industrial Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the question of materiality requires inquiry into the circumstances of the parties' 
relationship, expectations, and course of dealing, therefore, rejecting the assertion that warranty 
disclaimers and limitations of remedies are "per se" material for the purposes of U.C.C. § 2-
207(2)(b)). 
178. This is consistent with U.C.C. sections 2-204 and 2-206 which allow for contract formation 
through more than just the written documents. Section 2-204 states, 
(I) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show 
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a 
contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though 
the moment of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
Section 2-206 likewise provides for a variety of ways in which acceptance of an offer may be made. 
Section 2-206 provides, 
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(I) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any 
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances; 
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be 
construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the 
prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but such a 
shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller 
seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an 
accommodation to the buyer. 
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance 
an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer 
as having lapsed before acceptance. 
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Courts utilizing the "surprise or hardship" approach, however, may find 
that the term "hardship" is problematic. A broad definition of "hardship" 
could make every limitation of liability into a material alteration, and thus 
turn the "surprise or hardship" approach into the per se material approach. 
To counter this, the Chateaugay court formulated its test which collapses the 
"fails of its essential purpose" and "unconscionability" exceptions to section 
2-719 into the hardship prong. Even if a court should choose not to take this 
extra step, however, the "surprise or hardship" approach is still the superior 
model in analyzing limitation of liability clauses in a battle of the forms 
context. This can be seen by turning, once again, to our soccer club and 
polystyrene hypotheticals. 
In our soccer club hypothetical, if this was the first contract the club had 
ever made with the t-shirt company, there would be no prior course of 
dealing to indicate that a limitation on its liability was standard. This, 
coupled with the level of sophistication of the parties, might mitigate toward 
a finding of unfair surprise. Also, if the club had told the dealer of its time 
frame and the reasons why timely deliver was so important, it is likely that a 
court would find that the limitation worked a hardship upon the club. 
However, if the club was silent on the purpose of the t-shirts and had 
operated on numerous occasions under the very same terms without 
complaint, a court might find that the provision is a part of the contract. 
Likewise, in our polystyrene example the fact that these were 
sophisticated parties and· that this sort of limitation on liability was the 
industry standard would mitigate in favor of keeping the clause. However, if 
Company B had made its timeline and the importance of timely delivery 
clear, a court could still find that such a clause worked a hardship upon 
Company B and find that it was not a part of the contract. The point is, in 
either situation, the court is free to reach a result that is equitable under the 
circumstances and that takes into account the true intentions of the parties; a 
freedom which a per se approach severely limits, if it affords it at all. 
Though it is true that the "surprise or hardship" approach requires a much 
more detailed factual inquiry, and thus is more of a strain on judicial 
resources, it is the far more equitable approach and is more in keeping with 
the purposes of the U.C.C. As such, the "surprise or hardship" model is the 
superior approach. 
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IV. REVISED ARTICLE 2 AND ITS EFFECTS 
"On March I, 1990, a Study Group of the Permanent Editorial Board 
("PEB") for the U.C.C. released a Preliminary Report commenting on the 
need for a comprehensive revision of Article 2 of the U.C.C."179 A Drafting 
Committee was then created by the PEB, with the approval of the National 
Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws and the American Law 
Institute. 180 This Committee began work in 1991 and produced a series of 
draft revisions to Article 2. Though no state has yet adopted these revisions, 
it is likely that some form of these revisions will find their way into the state 
legislatures. 181 Thus, a review of the impact these revisions will have on 
section 2-207 is appropriate. 
Some observers have suggested that the Article 2 redrafting exercise 
was required entirely because of section 2-207. 182 Indeed, in its preliminary 
report, the Study Group of the PEB "found section 2-207 to be 
'controversial, complex and frequently litigated"' and "expressed the need to 
reconsider and simplify the section to reflect the underlying theory of the 
Article."183 Therefore, not surprisingly, one of the most sweeping changes 
to the U.C.C. under the revisions is to the battle of the forms section. 184 The 
revised section 2-207 states: 
SECTION 2-207. TERMS OF CONTRACT; EFFECT OF 
CONFIRMATION. 
If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract 
although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) a 
contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract 
formed in any manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms 
additional to or different from those in the contract being confirmed, 
the terms of the contract, subject to Section 2-202, are: 
179. Alex Devience, Jr., The Renewed Search for the "Bargain in Fact" Under U.C.C. Section 2-
207: Battle of the Forms, Part II? Comments on the Recommendation to Revise Section 2-207, 9 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 349,351 (1997). 
180. See Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Redrafting U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Economic 
Prescription for the Battle of the Forms, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 403,404 and n.3 (1996). 
181. For example, in February of 2005, the Kansas legislature considered adopting a form of the 
revised Article 2. Bills proposing the adoption of Revised U.C.C. Article I (HB 2453) and the 2003 
amendments to U.C.C. Article 2 (HB 2454) were introduced in the Kansas House on February II, 
2005. H.R. 2453, 2005 Leg., 2005 Sess. (Kan. proposed 2005); H.R. 2454, 2005 Leg., 2005 Sess. 
(Kan. proposed 2005) . 
.. 182. See Phillip A. White, A Few Comments About the Proposed Revisions to UCC Section 2-207: 
The Battle of the Forms Taken to the Limit of Reason, 103 CoM. L.J. 471,473 (1998). 
183. Devience, supra note 179, at 352 (internal quotations omitted). 
184. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 332. 
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(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties; 
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties 
agree; and 
(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this 
Act.1ss 
Revised section 2-207 first asks if a contract has been formed and then, 
if so, asks what the terms of the contract are. 186 Subsections (a), (b) and (c) 
of the revised 2-207 answer this second question. 187 The revised section 
"rejects the possibility of surprising the parties with unbargained for terms 
by defining the terms of the agreement to be those terms that the parties 
expressly agreed to, either in their forms or otherwise, and those terms 
provided by the U.C.C."188 Subsection (b) allows courts to consider and 
enforce varying terms, whether in the record or not, including different and 
additional terms, so long as they are agreed to. 189 
Noticeably absent from the revised section 2-207(b) is the "material 
alteration" language. 190 The revised section 2-207 instead asks courts to 
determine whether a party "agrees" to the other party's terms, thus giving 
courts a great deal of discretion to include or exclude terms. 191 Though this 
would seem to eliminate many of the problems associated with the current 
section 2-207 and its comments, which have led to a rather mechanical 
approach to what terms "materially alter" a contract, this portion of the 
revision faces its own challenges. It is under subsection (b) that many courts 
185. See Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 - Sales 26 § 2-207 
(National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, July 26 - August 2, 2002), 
http://www .law. upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/annual2002.htm [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. 
186. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 332 (noting that the answer to the first question 
is provided by §§ 2-204 and 2-206); James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. 
L. REv. 723, 729 (2004). 
187. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 332-33; James J. White, supra note 186, at 
730. 
188. Proposed Amendments, supra note 185, § 2-207(a)- (c); Ostas & Darr, supra note 180, at 
420. 
189. See James J. White, supra note 186, at 730; Ostas & Darr, supra note 180, at 420. 
190. I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 3.21, at 332-33. 
191. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 185, § 2-207(b); I FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, § 
3.21, at 333; James J. White, supra note 186, at 730 (stating that this subsection gives courts 
"latitude to find agreement in the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the parties, even when the term 
to which they have agreed is not included in the records that either party has sent, and even when the 
agreed-to term is contradicted by the other's form"). 
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and commentators may find variance in interpreting what has and has not 
been agreed to. 192 
Subsection (b) is of particular interest to this discussion because it 
appears to cover situations in which additional terms are unilaterally added 
by one party. Subsection (b) provides that such terms are included if the 
parties "agree" to the terms, but does not define "agree." Indeed, the 
comments state that "the text recognizes the enormous variety of 
circumstances that may be presented under this section, and the section gives 
the court greater discretion to include or exclude certain terms than original 
Section 2-207 did."193 Despite this vote of confidence in the judiciary to 
easily determine when a term has been expressly agreed upon, it is likely 
that courts will still struggle when terms are added, with no objection by the 
other party, and a contract is moved forward upon. 194 After all, a term which 
is industry standard or has always been a part of the parties' course of 
conduct may be deemed to be expressly agreed to simply by the fact that this 
is the way the parties have conducted business in the past and no objection 
was lodged on the occasion in question. In effect, this could return courts to 
the "surprise or hardship" approach. 195 The same factors that are considered 
in determining surprise and hardship, i.e., course of conduct, sophistication 
of the parties, industry customs and the inconspicuousness of the term would 
all help a court in determining whether a term was agreed to. 196 Indeed, 
proposed comment 4 explicitly states that "[a]n 'agreement' may include 
terms derived from a course of performance, a course of dealing, and usage 
of trade."197 Considering that "the primary reason for a 2-207 is to prevent 
unfair surprise and advantage taking by the use of forms in transactions 
where all of the terms are not contained in a single record,"198 it is logical to 
192. See James J. White, supra note !86, at 730 (positing that judicial interpretation of parties' 
conduct in determining what terms have been agreed to "will be the battlefield under amended 
Section 2-207"); see also Phillip A. White, supra note 182, at 485-86 (noting that the distinction 
between "express agreement" and "implied agreement" is really unimportant and that the Code still 
embraces both aspects of agreement elsewhere). 
193. Proposed Amendments, supra note 185, § 2-207 note 3. 
194. See Phillip A. White, supra note 182, at 485-86 (noting the confusion that may still exist with 
the undefined term "expressly agreed"). 
195. See, U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (2004); see also discussion supra notes 132-35 and 
accompanying text. 
196. See supra Part III.C.3. 
197. Proposed Amendments, supra note 185, § 2-207 note 4. 
198. Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2- Sales, § 2-207 (National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, May I, 1998), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/b!Vulc/ucc2/ucc2598.htm. 
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conclude that many of the same factors developed under the "surprise and 
hardship" approach should apply under the revision. 199 
V. CONCLUSION 
The primary goals of the drafters of section 2-207 were to overcome 
both the evils of the "mirror-image rule" as well as the "last shot" doctrine. 
At common law, last minute additions that limited liability could be used as 
an excuse to escape an unfavorable contract or, in the alternative, could 
oppressively place limitations on parties that were deemed to have accepted 
the new "counter-offer" through their performance. By and large, section 2-
207 has accomplished the goals of eliminating these inequitable results, but 
the adoption of per se rules can defeat the purposes of U.C.C. section 2-207 
either by effectively allowing parties to escape from clauses to which they 
may have actually assented, or enforcing limitations on parties that were 
never contemplated, or negotiated for. The "surprise or hardship" approach, 
however, focuses on whether the terms in question were actually 
contemplated by considering factors like course of conduct and 
performance, industry customs, inconspicuousness and the sophistication of 
the parties as well as the circumstances surrounding each particular contract. 
Because this approach accomplishes the purposes of the U.C.C., it is 
superior to the per se approaches and therefore per se models should be 
rejected. Though revisions have been contemplated which do away with the 
"material alteration" language of 2-207 which gave rise to the "surprise or 
hardship" approach, this approach may very well remain useful to courts in 
jurisdictions that adopt the revisions. The "surprise or hardship" approach, 
and the factors it takes into account, will aid courts in determining whether a 
term, such as one limiting liability, has been "expressly agreed" to or 
whether such terms "materially vary" from the original agreement-issues 
courts will consider under the revised section. As such, the "surprise or 
hardship" model should remain a practical way of determining the 
applicability of limitation of liability clauses in a battle of the forms context. 
199. See Ostas & Darr, supra note 180, at 424 (concluding that trade customs, previous course of 
dealing, course of performance, and the supplementary provisions of Article 2 provide the core 
factors to be considered in exchange expectations). 
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